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Defendants and Appellants 6200 South Associates, H. Roger
Boyer and Kern C. Gardner (collectively referred to as "6200 South
Associates"), submit the following Reply Brief of Appellants:
DETERMINATIVE RULE
The only

determinative

constitutional

provision, statute,

ordinance or rule are Rules and 703 and 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence which are attached as Exhibit "A."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UDOT's Brief is a virtual confession of prejudicial error.
starts with UDOT f s witness, VanDrimmelen, intentionally
evidence on the inadmissible Chevron Oil offer.

It

set-up

UDOT has no

rational explanation as to how the Chevron offer can stand.
Second, the ruling of the trial court in permitting UDOT,
through its witness Clinger, to testify as to undefined and unknown
properties

with

undefined

access

and

without

foundation was erroneous and highly prejudicial.

any

evidentiary

UDOT's admission

in its brief that the purpose of the evidence was to show that
unknown "investors" were willing to invest unknown "resources" in
unknown "properties" is the undoing of UDOT's masquerade.
Third, to bar the Landowner's counsel from conducting crossexamination, using hypothetical questions to test the validity and
credibility of UD0T f s experts, is now unquestioned error.

It was

prejudicial, particularly when combined with other error of trial.
Fourth, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow
UDOT to take the position at trial that the diamond interchange of
1-215 BEFORE condemnation of the property in this case led to an
insular county lane.

UDOT had lost on that issue in a three-day

bench trial before the lower court in which the court determined
that the subject property should be considered as abutting upon I215 and ancillary roads because the freeway had been planned and
property acquired for it in the early 1960s.

But UDOT virtually

scuttled the lower court ruling by having its appraisers take the
position at trial that the diamond interchange, upon which the
property abutted and as to which UDOT had committed under oath to
build, was essentially of no value because the freeway would have
dumped

its

traffic

secondary lane.

onto

a

patently

unreasonable

and

unsafe

By permitting UDOT to subvert the trial court's

earlier bench ruling, the court essentially permitted its initial
bench ruling to be overturned.
In summary, the diseased Chevron offer allowing the jury to
hear values of $12 - $18 per square foot for the remaining property
suggested

fundamentally,

as

UDOT

argued,

that

UDOT

did

the

Landowner a favor by condemning all of the property's prime access
and air, light and view.

The supposed curative instruction of the

trial court only reinforced

the evidence of the offer

for it

allowed the jury to consider existence of the offer with only the
numbers having been stricken.
reversal and new trial.

That evidence, alone, warrants a

Combined with the other imperfections as

set out in this appeal, it fully justifies

setting

aside the

judgment of the court and remanding the case for a new trial on the
issues of compensation and damages.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A
THIRD
PARTY
OFFER
ON
THE
LANDOWNERS1
PROPERTY
IS FLATLY
INADMISSIBLE
AND
CANNOT
BE
RATIONALIZED AS AN ADMISSION AGAINST
INTERESTS OF 6200 SOUTH ASSOCIATES.
A,

The Chevron Offer from a Third Party Was Not Admissible.
In the lower court, UDOT did not challenge the proposition

that offers on a landowner's property made by a third party are
inadmissible.1 UDOT cannot now raise that claim for the first time
on appeal.2

UDOT, however, argued then and now argues3 that the

tainted VanDrimmelen testimony regarding the purported Chevron Oil
offer "may have been admissible as an admission against interest."4
UDOT's argument is indefensible as a matter of law.

Rule

801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence puts the argument to rest:
(d)
Statements Which Are Not Hearsay.
statement is not hearsay if:

A

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity, or
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth, . . . .
(Emphasis added.) The plain reading of Rule 801(d)(2) demonstrates
HjDOT's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant? s Motion for Additur or Alternatively for a New Trial at
19-20 (R. 369-70) ("UDOT's Memo").
2

E.g., State By & Through Its Road Commission v. Larkin, 27
Utah 295, 495 P.2d 817, 821 (1972).
3

Appellee's Br. at 18-19.

4

UD0T's Memo at 3 (R. 353).
3

that, at minimum, an admission against interest must be a statement
made by a "party-opponent," viz., by one of the partners of 6200
South Associates.

The authority cited and quoted in UDOT's Brief,

at 18-19 specifically refers to

"declarations by an owner,"5

"admissions of a party . . . his agent . . . or by a privity,"6 or
"any statement

. . . made by a party."7

But VanDrimmelen! s

evidence was that the statement came from a Chevron Oil employee.8
Chevron was not a party-opponent and, thus, does not fall within
Rule 801(d)(2).

VanDrimmelen's testimony on the supposed Chevron

offer was hearsay and fundamentally inadmissible.
B.

The Cases Cited by UDOT do not Support the Admissibility
of VanDrimmelenfs Testimony On the Chevron Offer.
On the critical question of admissibility of VanDrimmelenf s

testimony on the Chevron offer, UDOT misstates the holdings it
cites.

It cites Nichols on Eminent Domain and three cases in

support of the doubtful proposition that notwithstanding Rule
801(d)(2), "an offer is admissible for the purpose of showing
interest in property for a particular use."9

The cases do not so

hold.
In City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1960),
the Missouri court held that testimony that there had been "a
5

Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. O'Malley, 421 N.E.2d 980
(111. 1981).
6

29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600 at 655.

7

Korleski v. Needham, 222 N.E.2d 334, 337 (111. 1966).

8

Tr. at 684-85 (R. 1103-04).

9

Appelleefs Br. at 9 (emphasis added).
4

marked number of inquiries" by persons interested in purchasing the
land "was not the equivalent of an offer to buy, and was not
inadmissible for the reasons . . • that an offer to buy is
inadmissible." JEd. at 848 (emphasis added).

The court found that

there was no evidence of any offer in Vasquez.

Thus, the case

stands for the direct contrary of the proposition cited by UDOT.
As Vasquez acknowledges, "an offer to buy is inadmissible."
UDOT quotes, as though it were law, pure dicta

Id.

from Kelly v.

Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny Co., 180 A.2d 39 (Pa. 1962).
In that case counsel made a proffer of evidence that an offer had
been made.

The trial court ruled "I will not permit evidence of

the price, but I will permit you to show that an offer was made."
However, " [notwithstanding this ruling counsel . . . did not then
produce any testimony of offers made." Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
Because the issue in Kelly was whether the lower court erred in
excluding the amount of the offer, and because the offer itself was
never offered in evidence, Kelly is not the law of Pennsylvania on
whether an offer is admissible for some other purpose than value.
Much less is it the law of the State of Utah.
Commonwealth Department of Highways v. Turner, 497 S.W.2d 57
(Kan.

1973), like Vasquez, stands for the antithesis of the

proposition cited by UDOT.

The audacity of UDOT's citation of

Turner is apparent when the language omitted from the quotation in
UD0T?s brief is considered:
The Commonwealth complains that over its
objections the owners were permitted to
introduce evidence of inquiries concerning the
possible purchase or lease of the property. A
5

witness was asked whether he had been " . . .
approached by any major oil company or any
motel people or persons in business with
shopping centers . . . " with respect to
acquiring the property ". . .in the area that
has been taken by the Commonwealth in this
condemnation." Over an objection the witness
was permitted
to answer, which answer
indicated that there had been such inquiries.
[Another witness was similarly permitted to
testify, yes or no, as to whether there had
been such inquiri€js.] No witness was asked
about prices or terms of any offer and the
evidence was restricted to inquiries showing
an interest in the property.
It is our
opinion that this evidence was properly
admitted and did not fall into the category of
offers, which, of course, may not be shown.
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
The statement by Nichols, supra, is without

support, is

vacuous and would turn eminesnt domain cases into a folly in which
UDOT would be on the other side the great bulk of the time. It has
only a trio of Missouri and Pennsylvania cases more than 30 years
old which, on examination, do not stand for the proposition in
support of which they are cited.
Had UDOT's argument confined itself to a consideration of the
implications of established Utah law in this area, it would have
found that the policy of Utah eminent domain law is clearly
inconsistent with the admissibility of offers by a third party. As
the Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. Tedesco, 291 P.2d 1028
(Utah 1956), a jury
are not to inquire what a speculator might be
able to realize out of a resale in the future,
but what a present purchaser would be willing
to pay for it in the condition it is now in.
Id. at 1030.

Utah thus finds itself among the vast majority of

6

jurisdictions of whom Nichols remarks, "it is thought best by most
courts to reject evidence of offers altogether." 5 Nichols on
Eminent Domain § 21.4[1].
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE
JURY TO DISREGARD ALL OF UDOTf s
EXPERTf s TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
INADMISSIBLE
CHEVRON
OFFER
TO
PURCHASE AN UNDEFINED PORTION OF THE
REMAINING PROPERTY.
UDOT exacerbates the error of the trial court by arguing that
6200 South Associates objected to the VanDrimmelen testimony, moved
to strike the same, and that it was granted.

From that UDOT

contends that the Landowner "cannot complain where its objection
has been sustained."10

UDOT is in error.

6200 South Associates1

motion to strike went to all of VanDrimmelen1 s testimony on the
Chevron offer. UDOT acknowledged the error but contended that only
the alleged offering price should be stricken.

The lower court

agreed with UDOT, instructing the jury to disregard only the $12.00
and $18.00 per square foot pricing terms.
There now can be no doubt that UDOT was aware that the
testimony relating to the Chevron offer would be blurted out by
VanDrimmelen,11 UDOT does not even bother to assert otherwise in its

10

Appellee Br. at 13-14.

n

I n a moment of candor, in argument on appellant's motion to
strike this portion of Mr. VanDrimmelen's testimony, Mr. Coleman
for UDOT stated as follows:
Your Honor, I would agree with counsel that
the amount should not have come in. I did not
anticipate that they would. . . .
7

brief.

While it is true that the Court initially sustained the

Landowners' objection to the inadmissible Chevron offer,12 that
objection only could be made after the testimony came in because
the question did not illicit testimony relating to an offer:
question did not even mention the word "offer."

the

After counsel

argued the point outside of the jury's presence, the lower court
gave the following instruction to the jury:
THE COURT: The record will reflect the
presence of the jury, the alternative, counsel
and the parties. Ladies and gentlemen, it is
not uncommon for the Court, in a trial of this
complexity and this duration, to occasionally
tell the jury to just disregard something they
have heard.
The Court is telling you to do
that. It happens occasionally. And the Court
has confidence in the maturity and the
responsibility of the jurors to the extent
that they will do as the Court tells them.
There has been some testimony given by
the witness now on the stand [VanDrimmelen]
regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen,
and confined by Chevron Oil, regarding the
value of the questioned property per square
foot. Specifically, there was a reference of
$18 per square foot with access, $12 per
square foot without access. Supposedly, that
value was confirmed by a representative of
Chevron Oil.
Disregard that portion of the
expert witness' testimony that referred to
that subject matter.
Tr. 700-01 (R. 1119-20) (emphasis added). 13
The curative instruction the lower court gave to the jury,
therefore, did

12

not solve the problem.

The jury was

left to

Tr. 685-86 (R. 1104-05).

13

The original testimony and ruling, the argument of counsel,
the Court's ruling, and the Court's instructions to the jury are
reproduced in full in attached Exhibit "B" hereto.

8

consider in its deliberations that Chevron had made an offer for an
undefined portion of the property.

UDOT did not lay any foundation

as to whether the supposed Chevron offer covered one-tenth of an
acre, five acres, or all of the remaining 18.7 acres.
as

UDOT

contends,

the

Landowner's

obligation

It was not,

to

emphasize

inadmissible testimony.
The whole VanDrimmelen saga as staged and orchestrated was
highly

prejudicial

to

6200

South

Associates.

Most

VanDrimmelen's testimony on Chevron remained before the jury.

of
Only

the "technicality" of the price per square foot was struck, with
many of the jurors having every reason to believe that the Chevron
offer was most relevant, but for some esoteric reason in the law,
the so-called offering price could not remain.

The damage from

this tainted and incompetent testimony was sought and achieved by
UDOT.
There

is

an

almost

VanDrimmelen testimony.
throughout

his

fatuous

contradiction

to

the

staged

He had contended to the point of advocacy

testimony

that

the

property

could

not

have

commercial potential or use BEFORE or AFTER the taking because the
Landowner could not obtain commercial

zoning.14

On the other

hand, the Landowner never took the position that the remaining
property in the AFTER condition had commercial potential or use.15
What then, one must ask, was the basis of VanDrimmelen' s testimony
of the supposed Chevron Oil offer?
14

Clearly, this Chevron testimony

Tr. at 683-84 & 686 (lines 19-21) (R. 1102-03 & 1105).

15

Cook [Tr. 289 (R. 709)]; Brown [Tr. 472 (R. 891)].

9

of $12 - $18 per square foot was not in rebuttal to the Landowner's
testimony and it contradicted VanDrimmelen's own opinion on use and
value AFTER the taking.
The answer to the question and to the VanDrimmelen nonsequitur
lies in the fact that by this diseased Chevron offer, UDOT was able
to get before the jury the hocus-pocus values of $12 - $18 per
square foot for some undefined portion of the remaining property
AFTER the taking, when both the Landownerfs and UDOTfs testimony as
to land value BEFORE the taking ranged between $2.50 and $4.00 per
square foot. Quite obviously, the $12 - $18 per square foot price
would have had to refer to commercial use and value. Accordingly,
even

though

the

Chevron

testimony

cut

squarely

against

VanDrimmelenf s unrelenting opinion against commercial use and value
AFTER the taking, it was worth it to UDOT, for it planted in the
jury's mind the distinct possibility that the remaining property
could be worth as much as six times more AFTER than it was BEFORE
condemnation.

Thus, UDOT could argue (as it did) that UDOT had

done the Landowners a favor by condemning all of their prime access
and

that

the

Landowners

had

achieved,

consequently,

an

extraordinary windfall. Therein lies the irreparable prejudice and
reversible error from which UDOT cannot escape.16

16

Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d
481 (Utah 1979).
10

POINT III.
UDOT'S ARGUMENT WITH REGARD TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY
OF
UNDEFINED
PROPERTIES IN DOCTORED PHOTOGRAPHS
IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT AND VACUOUS.
ALONE, IT REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE
JUDGMENT AND A NEW TRIAL.
UDOT f s justification for the use by its witness, dinger, of
tampered photographs demonstrating undefined and unknown properties
as evidence of access in the case is rapacious and without any
authority.
consistent

UDOT proffered
objection

of

and

the

the trial court

Landowner,

allowed,

dinger's

over

half-a-dozen

photographs of various freeway interchanges in which properties
were situated in varying degrees of proximity.

But the record is

absolutely clear that:
1.

dinger

did

not

identify

one,

single

property

by

demonstrating its size, shape, means of access, zoning or
any other element of relevance to the subject property;
2.

dinger did not identify the properties by ownership, by
sale that had taken place, by a comparison of a sale with
and without freeway influence;

3.

There was not a scrap of evidence to indicate the ability
of the photographed properties to compete, whether the
land and improvements could be reasonably used in the
market, the nature of businesses or their condition;

4.

To sum up, UDOT f s dinger offered not a shred of evidence
about

any properties

or their

use

—

merely

aerial

photographs of several interchanges in the metropolitan
Salt Lake area.
11

UDOTfs confession of what dinger's use of the photographs and
the "phantom" properties should not be lost on this Court,

UDOT

writes in its brief as follows:
Mr. Clinger testified regarding five
developments on or near interchanges that had
been developed for commercial - business type
uses. The purpose was to show that investors
had been willing to invest considerable
resources to develop properties with access
restrictions similar to the subject.
UDOT Br. at 21-22.
Of

course, the* burning

questions

are what

property

assortment of properties constituted "five developments?"

or

What

"investors" were willing to "invest considerable resources?" "What
properties had access restrictions similar to the subject?"

UDOT

had no answer to any of these questions for this Court in its
appeal brief or at trial, either on direct examination or on crossexamination by the Landowner.

The law requires otherwise.

RDA

of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974);
(see citation of Utah authorities in Appellants1 Opening Br. at 24,
fn. 5.)

The photographs of undefined and unknown properties were

introduced without required foundation and UDOTf s argument thereon
is vacuous.
UD0Tfs argument that the doctored photographs were admissible
simply because Clinger stated he had taken the photographs into
account in forming his opinion must be rejected.

Acceptance of

that argument would permit UDOT to manufacture a rule of law that
so long as a party could get an expert witness to say that a
certain factor was taken into account, such factor would be
12

admissible.
proposition

Such
that

an

argument

the expert

would

witness

lead

and

not

straight
the

to

court

the

would

determine admissibility of elements to support an expert opinion.
It would allow in this case, for example, the appraiser to use a
photograph of unknown properties in Chicago or Los Angeles without
any foundation.
UDOTf s position on this Point of the appeal makes a travesty
of the law and of Utah Rules of Evidence 703. That Rule permits an
expert to predicate an opinion upon information "reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field."

There was no evidence

produced through dinger or otherwise that the photographs showing
the unknown and undefined properties with unknown and undefined
access is information

that that is ordinarily

relied

upon by

appraisal experts.
The admission of the "sheen green" photographs was prejudicial
error by the trial court and requires a reversal and new trial.
POINT IV.
THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON THE
LANDOWNERSf
CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF
UDOT's EXPERT WITNESSES UTILIZING
HYPOTHETICALS
NOT
BASED
UPON
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS IMPROPER
AND PREJUDICIAL.
UDOT argues in its brief that "some" hypothetical questions
were allowed
experts,

and

on cross examination by the Landowner
therefore,

the

Landowner

was

given

of UDOTf s
an

ample

opportunity to cross-examine UDOT's expert appraisal witnesses.
That contention is ill-conceived.

UDOT's brief at 27, 28.

The fact that some of hypothetical questions were allowed is
13

not relevant. One hypothetical question lays the foundation for a
point which tests the expert's opinion only after
hypotheticals have been asked.

following

It may not be until the last

question is asked that the point to which the hypothetical crossexamination is directed may be established, resulting in the
expert's confession of error, confusion or unreasonableness.

The

substantial

the

relationship

between

access

to

property

and

property's value was a lynch pin question in the entire case. The
trial judge cut off hypothetical cross examination regarding it.
Cross-examining an experienced government witness may be one
of the most difficult tasks facing the trial lawyer.

To impose

unwarranted restrictions on cross-examination as was done in this
case, chokes off the development of evidence necessary to a
reasoned verdict.

Utah case law encourages cross-examination

utilizing hypotheticals wherther or not found upon facts in the
record.

In a landmark case decided by the Utah Supreme Court in

1953, State of Utah v. Peek, 265 P.2d 630 (Utah 1953), the high
Court specifically declared:
A witness who has given an opinion of value
may . . . in the discretion of the court, be
asked questions on cross examination, fore the
purpose of testing his opinion, which would be
improper upon direct examination. He may, for
example, be ask€>d how far certain assumed
facts would modify his judgment. . . .
Id. at 638.
Why UDOT fails to cite the above-quoted portion of Peek is not
answered.

UDOT's reliance upon a 90 year old case, Nichols v.

Oregon Shortline R.R. Company, 25 Utah 240, 70 P. 996 (1902), is
14

misplaced.

A careful examination of the facts in Nichols clearly

demonstrates that the principle for which UDOT cites the case is
not the law.

The holding of the Utah Court in Nichols was that a

hypothetical question on cross-examination was required to contain
all material facts in the record relating to the matter.
question omitted any material fact, it was improper.

If the

That has not

been the law in Utah for at least 40 years.
UDOT's argument is flawed.

The trial judge clearly erred

prejudicially in failing to permit hypothetical questions to be
asked of UD0T f s experts on the critical subject of loss of access.
POINT V.
UDOT ! s
EXPERTS
INTENTIONALLY
DISTORTED THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
TOTAL PROPERTY BEFORE CONDEMNATION
TO THE 1-215 FREEWAY AND SUPPORTING
ROADS,
WHICH
DISTORTION
SUBSTANTIALLY CIRCUMVENTED THE LOWER
COURT'S PRIOR RULING.
A strange paradox developed in the trial of this case.

After

several days of a bench trial, legal memoranda and oral argument,
the lower court properly ruled that the 1-215 Project, in all of
its aspects, had to be taken into account in determining market
value of the subject property as of the date of taking.

It would

have defied not only common sense, but virtually every aspect of
public highway planning for the 1-215 Diamond Interchange to have
been constructed (as was necessarily assumed) in the Court's ruling
without

supporting

interchange.

and

corollary

access

roads

to

feed

the

UDOT was clearly aware of that fact and had shown a

connector road to the interchange (whether Diamond or Urban) long
15

before the 1989 Urban Interchange was finalized and 6200 South
Associates' property was condemned.
Nonetheless, at trial, UDOT intentionally distorted the BEFORE
condition of the subject property under the guise that the Diamond
Interchange would dump its traffic on to patently inadequate county
lane at 6200 South.

The trial evidence of the Landowners properly

assumed that the express connector road from the mouth of Big
Cottonwood Canyon would tie the diamond Interchange of 1-215.
UDOT

to

rest

its case

on

the premise

that

the

1979

For

Diamond

Interchange would be hobbled with an unsafe and improper secondary
lane undermined and mocked the earlier ruling of the lower court.
The introduction of that evidence at trial was error for which
a new trial should be granted.
POINT VI.
THE FACT THAT THE JURY VERDICT IS IN
THE RANGE OF THE APPRAISAL ESTIMATES
IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE IN THIS APPEAL
WHERE THE APPEAL IS ON ISSUES OF LAW
OTHER
THAN
INADEQUACY
OF
THE
VERDICT.
UDOT claims that there is no reversible error because the jury
verdict was within the range of the appraisers1 testimony.17

That

is only the presumption where the inadequacy of the award, as a
matter of law, is appealed.
issue in this appeal.

The Landowner has not raised that

Rather, it is the individual and cumulative

weight of the prejudicial errors addressed

in the

Landowner's

Opening Brief that resulted in a skewed and improper jury verdict

UDOT Br. at 39-40.
16

favorable

to UDOT.

The low amount of the jury verdict only

emphasizes the significance and prejudice of the errors.
The effect of the inadmissible Chevron offer and the undefined
property

photos, alone, in the minds of

the jury

is

readily

apparent when the jury verdict is compared against the expert
appraiser's testimony . . . the jury verdict almost adopts one or
the other of UDOT's expert appraisers' position on value of the
property taken and severance damage. After the testimony regarding
the

inadmissible

Chevron

offer

and

the unknown

and

undefined

interchange properties, the jury was left with the impression that
UDOT did the Landowner a favor by taking all of the properties'
prime access.18
CONCLUSION
The difficulties apparent in UDOT's answering brief makes it
clear that the trial court committed prejudicial error at trial.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and a new trial
ordered on the issue of just compensation in the case.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. C A M F B 4 ^ J ^ 3 K J ' /
KEVIN E. ANDERSON
of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Z

Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants 6200 South Associates,
H. Roger Boyer and Kern C. Gardner
January 13, 1993.
18
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Exhibit A

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.

Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Exhibit B

has been left, that there is a probability, as of February
1988, that this property could have been zoned commercial, do
you?
THE WITNESS:
MR. CAMPBELL:

Not zoned commercial, no.
We object to the question on the

grounds that it calls for speculation.

There is no foundation

for it.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

Do you understand the

question?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
A.

I do.

You may answer it.

Supposing that it were zoned commercial, could —

I

have forgotten the question.
Q.

(By Mr. Coleman)

Physically, would this property be

accessible, given the configuration of the property in the
after condition?
MR. CAMPBELL:

Objection.

That's vague and

ambiguous as to what this property were accessible —
that has no definitive statement.
THE COURT:

I object to it.

Do you understand the question?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I mean,

I do.

You may answer.

Overruled.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What would your reason for that conclusion be?

A.

Three reasons.

Number one, there are many examples
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1

of commercial development that are located near interchanges,

2

that are not accessible just off of the interchange.

3

by comparability, you could do it.

4

So just

The second reason is that in a discussion with Heber

5

Jacobsen, when I was —

met with him, he informed me that he

6

had been negotiating with Chevron Oil to put a convenience

7

store on the northeast corner of this site.

8

that he —

9

was negotiating at $18 a square foot.

in fact, he did state —

And I believe

I have in my notes —

he

But if the access —

if

10

it was not accessible off of Big Cottonwood Canyon Road, that

11

the offering price was somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 to

12

12.

13

They confirmed it.

14

that Al Frandsen, I spoke with —

15

accessibility off of Big Cottonwood Canyon, he would like to

16

have it, but knew that he couldn't have it, and he is willing

17

to pay $18 -a square foot

18

I called Chevron Oil, to ask them if this was the case.
They did confirm the $18.

MR. CAMPBELL:

And they said

he said that the

—
I am going to object to this.

This

19

has been —

this whole area of examination has been framed to

20

get in this one statement.

21

going to ask that the entire area go out, and this witness1

22

last statement that somebody was willing to offer something is

23

clearly not evidence in this courtroom.

24

spoken on this time and again.

25

THE COURT:

I am going to object to it.

I am

The Supreme Court has

I object to it.

The portion of the answer that related
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to a negotiated offer will be stricken from the record.
rest of the answer will remain.

The

You may proceed with the

balance of your answer.
A.

Nevertheless, Mr. Frandsen did indicate that he

would pay the same price for an access off of 30th East, would
love to have that location.
MR. CAMPBELL:
well.

I am going to object to that, as

It is just the same thing.

same answer.

It is just a —

it is the

It is just simply disguised in wolf's clothing.

I object to it.
THE COURT:

Technically, the objection is correct.

The objection is sustained.
A.
that

Answer the rest of the question.

I don't know what else to answer, except to say

—
MR. CAMPBELL:

The witness has answered the

question, along with many others.
THE COURT:

Have you answered the question fully, to

your satisfaction?
THE WITNESS:

I guess just a point of clarification,

and that is that I doubt that they would —

I don't believe

that they would ever get the zoning for it.
MR. CAMPBELL:
absolutely no —

If the Court please, this has

this witness now is in the area of talking

about the probability of rezoning.

It stemmed from the very

issue we just discussed with the Court at the bench.

That was
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1
2

THE COURT:

Does the question or the answer assume

that the property would be zoned commercially?

3

MR. CAMPBELL:

Indeed, it did.

And there is no

4

evidence before the Court, and that is not the position of the

5

State in this case.

6

that they were not going to make the claim that this property

7

had now had an increased or higher use to put the property to

8

after the taking, that there was no benefits.

9
10

THE COURT:

I mean, they have indicated to the Court

What is your response to the Court's

question about the reframing of the question?

11

MR. CAMPBELL:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CAMPBELL:

May I continue?

Let's clear that matter up first.
I think that that did not clear up

14

anything.

15

indeed, that what Counsel said is I want you to assume a

16

commercial use on the property.

17

question.

18

then suggested to Counsel, if you were to ask the question, if

19

the property were to be used for commercial purposes, is there

20

accessibility?

21

put.

22

that sort of use?

23

I indicated to the Court, at the bench, that,

That was the first

That's what brought my objection.

And the Court

At least that's the way that the question was

Is there accessibility to the remaining property, for

Judge, it became very clear that is not the case of

24

the State.

They don't maintain that position.

There was only

25

one reason for that testimony to come in, and that was so that
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this witness -- it was a set-up deal in this courtroom.

It

was a framed question, so that that witness could testify as
to a statement or a conversation with one of the partners in
the partnership, Jacobsen.
And he went on to testify, over objection, if the
Court please, that the property would have had a value of $18
a foot, square foot, but that without any access the property
could still have maybe $12 a square foot.
is absolute inflammatory evidence.

That, your Honor,

It is to suggest to the

Court and jury, clearly, it is relevant, is this property
worth $12 a square foot after the taking?
evidence points to.

That's what this

There is no other way that anybody can

justify or sustain the relevancy of it.
And, your Honor, the difficulty I have with that is
that that question was a setup, and, fortunately, while I
didn't know it was coming at the time, it was very clear, that
I approached the Court and asked the Court for leave to find
out, where are we going with a question like this?

I mean, I

said to the Court, suppose they ask him to assume that the
property could be zoned C-3 for skyscrapers.

Is there access

for that?
And I submit to the Court that that was wholly
hypothetical and speculative, and that, in fact, the question
was set up, it doesn't play a part of their case in chief at
all, Judge.

You asked counsel for the State, how is this
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relevant to your case on compensation?

And it isn't.

There

is no testimony to that effect, except for the highly
prejudicial statement about this conversation.
When I first heard it, I thought it may be an
admission of a party opponent.
that.

Therefore, I can't object to

But it turned out to be much more than that.

out to be a statement with regard to an offer.

It turned

Offers are not

admissible before this Court.
There are at least three reasons why this testimony
ought to go out.

If I have to cross-examine in this area,

then I run the risk of just reemphasizing the very issue.
is highly inflammatory.

It

It comes in this case after nearly a

week of trial, in which this Court has closely guarded its
rules on evidence.

While it has been, admittedly, liberal in

many of its rulings, yet it was very, very clear that this was
not part of the case in chief of the State, nor is it in
rebuttal to any testimony of the landowner.

It is highly

inflammatory.
If it is allowed to stand, then it can be argued.

I

submit to the Court that there is no answer to that, that I
can give, because if the Court allowed it in, it must have
relevance.

And it doesn't have any relevancy.

As I say, on

top of it, it doesn't carry the good faith that is required of
a party in submitting a case in chief.

It was a setup for the

Court.
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Unfortunately, the jury has now heard the evidence.
I think with a proper instruction at this time —
have asked for the time at this moment —
correct that.

that's why I

the Court can

But, otherwise, it will become very significant

and perhaps very prejudicial.

When somebody starts talking

about $18 a square foot, but, oh, dear, if you don't have any
access, maybe only $12 a square foot.
Judge.

Those are offers,

And they are absolutely irrelevant and improper.
THE COURT:

Response?

MR. COLEMAN:

Your Honor, I would agree with Counsel

that the amounts should not have come in.
anticipate that they would.
THE COURT:

The purpose

I did not
—

How do you propose that the Court deal

with that matter, without emphasizing the problem of which
Counsel complains?
MR. COLEMAN:
don't know, your Honor.
amount.

As far as the amount is concerned, I
That shouldn't have come in, the

And the purpose for the testimony was to indicate

that in the after condition, if there was a demand for
commercial property in the before, it was still there in the
after.

And the problem is the defendants, in their case in

chief, indicated that the highest and best use of the property
in the before condition was commercial, had some commercial
value, and highest and best use.
was —

The plaintiff's position

is, and has been, that it did not have a commercial
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1

highest and best use in the before condition, it had a highest

2

and potential best use in office space.

3

The reason for bringing the testimony out with this

4

witness, with regard to inquiries respecting commercial

5

development in the after, it was to show that if this property

6

could have been used for commercial purposes in the before

7

condition, it could have been used for commercial purposes in

8

the after condition.

9

That if this property had any commercial potential in the

Simply put, that is it in a nutshell.

10

before, it also had it in the after.

11

Nothing more, and nothing less.

12

THE COURT:

13
14

Simply put, that's it.

How do you propose that we correct the

portion of the expert witness1 answer relating to values?
MR. COLEMAN:

The only way I can suggest, your

15

Honor, is that the testimony with regard to the values be

16

stricken and disregarded by the jury.

17

way of doing it.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. COLEMAN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CAMPBELL:

I don't know of another

Anything else?
No, your Honor, that's all.
Response?
Quickly, the State's argument just

22

simply won't hunt.

It just —

that d o g w o n ' t h u n t ,

because

23

the witness wasn't talking about the fair market value of the

24

property before the taking.

o5

what the use of the property would be after the taking.

The question specifically ran to
And
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1

we haven't claimed —

2

this case that this property could be used for commercial

3

purposes in the condition in which it has been left-

4

didn't go to any rebuttal.

5

prejudiced as a consequence of this.

6

area ought to go out, not just the area with regard to the

7

offers, but —

8

also the entire area of examination ought to go out.

9

heaven's sakes, we haven't claimed in

So it

We have been substantially
I submit that the entire

specifically, as to those, it ought to -- but

THE COURT:

The Court is disinclined to throw the

10

baby out with the bath water.

11

agree on a surgically clean method of excising the reference

12

to the value, the Court believes that, with all of the

13

testimony the jurors have heard the last several days, this

14

particular testimony is not going to have any significant

15

impact for or against either party.

16

the jury according to its own assessment of the problem, or

17

the Court will instruct the jury pursuant to a stipulation of

18

both counsel, either way.

19

MR. CAMPBELL:

If Counsel, between you, can

The Court will instruct

I believe in the Court's wisdom.

20

Court has conducted this trial very ably.

21

ruled on my motion —

22

is done, but I think the Court certainly, in —

23

exercising the clear wisdom it has, can take care of the

24

problem.

25

THE COURT:

The

The Court can —

as

I am not prepared to stipulate to how it
as I say, in

The Court proposes to instruct the jury
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1

to disregard any reference by the witness now on the stand to

2

value of the property as it related to an alleged statement by

3

Mr. Jacobsen on the $18 before, $12 —

4

the access.

5

MR. COLEMAN:

$18 with, $12 without

I think he followed that up, also,

6

with testimony from a representative of Chevron Oil, where the

7

testimony —

8

from Chevron Oil was that there wouldn't be any difference in

9

the value, even with the restriction of access.

10
11
12

where the conversation with the representative

MR. CAMPBELL:
your Honor.

That's when the objection came in,

So that the whole area

THE COURT:

—

The defendants1 motion to strike those

13

portions of the testimony previously referred to, relating to

14

the $18 versus the $12 value of the questioned property, and

15

the confirming reference by Chevron Oil regarding those

16

values, will be stricken from the record.

17

refer to them in argument or in any further proceedings.

Counsel are not to

18

Bring the jury back.

19

(The jury returned to the courtroom.)

20

THE COURT:

The record will reflect the presence of

21

the jury, the alternate, counsel and the parties.

Ladies and

22

gentlemen, it is not uncommon for the Court, in a trial of

23

this complexity and this duration, to occasionally tell the

24

jury to just disregard something they have heard.

25

is telling you to do that.

The Court

It happens occasionally.

And the
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Court has confidence in the maturity and the responsibility of
the jurors to the extent that

they

will

do as

the

Court

tells

them.
There has been some testimony given by the witness
now on the stand regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen,
and confirmed by Chevron Oil, regarding the value of the
questioned property per square foot.

Specifically, there was

a reference of $18 per square foot with access, $12 per square
foot without access.

Supposedly, that value was confirmed by

a representative of Chevron Oil.

Disregard the portion of the

expert witness1 testimony that referred to that subject
matter.
You may proceed.
MR. COLEMAN:

Your Honor, just a housekeeping item,

we had offered Plaintiff's Exhibit 17.

I don't know if that

was admitted.
MR. CAMPBELL:
THE COURT:

I think the Court

—

In light of the Court's ruling, is the

exhibit appropriate otherwise?
MR. CAMPBELL:
Court —

I think Counsel did offer it, and the

I had an objection to it, because of the method that

this witness used, and the Court said that is a matter of
cross-examination.
THE COURT:

It is.

The exhibit is received.

You

may proceed.
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